Abstract
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the degree of influence which the EU has been able to exert in global electronic network communications. The sector itself is complex, growing, differentiated and, at the same time, convergent in character. However, for heuristic purposes, it can be usefully thought of as comprising the traditional sub-sectors of mass communications broadcasting, telecommunications and, more recently, the Internet. This paper places its focus on the Internet and telecommunications through an analysis of the recent features of the evolving international political economy of both sub-sectors, with which the EU is shown to have had a significant degree of engagement. There has been little work on the role of the EU in global electronic network communications (though see Singh 2008; Humphreys and Simpson 2005, chapter 7; Christou and Simpson 2007) , less still on a direct cross-comparison of the EU's performance globally within the sector.
The paper illustrates how, in telecommunications, a long established sector with origins in the late 1800s, its well established national-centricity and history has, paradoxically, played a significant factor in the way in which the EU has been able to establish and exert a role for itself in the international telecommunications policy-making arena. This has two core elements. First, the establishment of a governance framework at the EU level in which the European Commission, in particular, has come to play a very significant role.
Second, the ability of the EU to develop itself as a representative of its Member States in global telecommunications policy making. A core argument of the paper is that the EU's relatively high profile and success in respect of the first element has had a direct bearing on its ability to be influential in respect of the second.
That the above paradox exists hinges on the very strong pressures for internationalization which have developed within telecommunications over the last 25 years. The paper shows how these have been utilized by the EU to develop and cement its position as a key international actor in telecommunications. Here, the EU has served as an essential coordination point for Member States to develop concerted responses to the agenda of internationalization in telecommunications. From this, the EU, through the European Commission, has played a key role in 'uploading' successfully to the global institutional The article is structured as follows. The next section outlines the constituents of the analytical framework to be employed in considering the EU's influence in global Internet and telecommunications policy contexts. The following two sections briefly outline the key features of the EU's role in global Internet and telecommunications policy making with reference to the criteria of the analytical framework. The analysis finds that the EU has been able to play a more traditional and thus 'straightforward' negotiating role in telecommunications with considerable success in terms of fulfilling its constructed aims.
In global Internet policy-making by contrast, the EU has struggled to assert a coherent policy position, despite signs that its position is at this stage fairly well -though not entirely consistently -articulated. The final section of the paper compares the EU's performance in both cases and puts forward some conclusions regarding the conditions under which the EU is more likely, and less likely, to be influential as an international actor in global electronic communications policy.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to explain the EU's 'actorness' and thus its influence in the global telecommunications and Internet sub-sectors of electronic network communication, this article employs principally an analytical framework that draws on the literature on EU 'actorness' (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 2008) but also some specific work on the EU in international organizations (Jorgensen 2009 ) and the EU as a strategic actor (Smith and Xei 2009 ). The purpose of using such a framework is to unravel the context within which the EU is acting. Specifically, the aim is to investigate the opportunities that have enabled or constrained EU influence in the external environment of events, ideas and power; the capability of the EU to act (formulating and agreeing policy) in terms of the EU internal context and by virtue of its own identity, and, thirdly; related to opportunity and capability, the EU's ability to shape the behaviour of others and how it achieves this (or not) in the institutional and broader procedural contexts of the two cases under investigation. Beyond this, we aim to assess what type of influence the EU has been able to exert, and whether it has, in its interaction with the global telecommunications and Internet governance regimes, been effective in terms of achieving its stated goals and aims.
The three main aspects of this framework need to be unpacked further. First, 'opportunity' (Bretherton and Vogler 2008) . EU external factors (Jorgensen 2009; 12) , or as others have labelled it, the logic of the external opportunity structure (Smith and Xie 2009; 9) , denote the pressures and opportunities (to act) that arise from broader international structures in terms of both social and material content. For Jorgensen (2009: 12) this entails examination of the: 1) international distribution of power 2) international interaction and social structures 3) the influence of other governments (and organizations) 4) the international cultural environment. When analysing telecommunications and Internet governance, these are important factors, not least because these two sub-sectors of communications, and the EU's role within them, have evolved under different actor constellations, but with the US as primary in both (and thus the interaction between the EU and US significant), though less important in the case of telecommunications. Different local, national and global conditions and pressures also exist within different, though in part overlapping, timeframes in both cases. Finally, there are contrasting global institutions often underpinned by contradictory and contested governance principles in each case. Within telecommunications, for example, the movement away from the embedded liberalism of the 1970s towards the promotion of neoliberal ideas in the global political economy in the 1980s, of which the EU (through the European Commission) was a key protagonist, meant that it was ideally placed to influence the institutions that would govern world trade (WTO) and indeed to take a prominent position (alongside the US), in constructing, promoting and successfully embedding its own governance goals for the telecommunications sector internally and outwards through the WTO.
Within Internet governance, it was less ideas than events that provided the EU with the opportunity to intervene in the evolution of the global institutions that would provide rules for governing the sector. The US was the hegemonic actor in the evolution of the Internet and, subsequently, the early structures and institutions that governed it. The Internet evolved within the US, but by the mid-1990s, the pressures of commercialization led to a call for reforms from key national and international stakeholders and, with this, the globalization of Internet governance in order to provide a legitimate and legal basis for its increased use socially, financially and economically. Indeed, as Mueller (2002) demonstrates in his analysis of the creation of this body, the US government was instrumental in resolving tensions between rival coalitions in order to establish ICANN's identity for this purpose (albeit contested): as a private, not-for-profit, organization underpinned by the principle of self-regulation and governed by US (California) law.
Thus, whilst the EU was not in a position in terms of knowledge or influence to intervene in the initial deliberations and decisions of the US government to resolve 'internal' contestation and tensions in relation to the Internet, its established identity as powerful and important economic actor in the global political economy enabled it to enter the fray with the intention of playing a prominent role with the US, in defining the principles that would underpin ICANN working practices. In summary then, it was the pressures of globalization and the ideology of neoliberalism emanating from the US domestically, that allowed the EU to intervene as a significant actor within telecommunications, whereas with Internet governance, it was not the pressures of globalization/neoliberalism that drove the process per se, but, rather, the need to create a global institutional context to ensure the interoperability of the Internet.
The second aspect of our framework refers to EU internal factors (Jorgensen 2009; 10) ; in other words, the EU's capability to respond to opportunities in any given sector in order to shape the evolving (institutional) order. There are several aspects of this that are of interest to us in this paper. First, is the question of how far EU logic (see Smith and Xei 2009 ) is pre-eminent in the projection of any given position within the sectors we are exploring. In other words, how does the EU's internal logic -its institutional structures, internal politics and identity shape the positions being taken in relation to telecommunications and Internet governance? Related to this are questions of not only internal coherence and consistency -that is vertical (between different levels of responsibility) and horizontal (between EU institutions) (see Nuttall 2005) -but also of which actors influence EU positions and projections (including private companies, transnational actors and interest groups) and indeed who represents the EU in the relevant international institutions within the sectors under investigation (Jorgensen 2009: 11) . This is important, as internal executive division and more than one institutional voice can often lead to a lack of coherence, coordination and clarity in the EU's position and thus external capacity to influence. However, and as others have argued, many EU actor voices in any given international institution need not necessarily lead to ineffectivenessas long as there is consistency and clarity in the position projected this might well facilitate an image among third parties, especially in the developing world, of the EU as a non-hegemonic and equal partner rather than hierarchical actor, within negotiations and deliberations (Elgström 2007) .
In terms of identity or political culture, this is also a significant factor in terms of both how the EU frames its own importance in a given issue area, but also the implications this has for the normative projections of the EU in any given sector. The EU's influence in any global sector is very much connected to its evolving identity as a contributor to global order (Smith 2007 ) and the need to assert itself within any given arena precisely because of its identity. How, then, does the EU's own cultural or normative framing of itself in a particular issue area impact on the projected solutions for policy and governance in any given sector? Of course, this is not separate to the questions above on the EU's internal politics -indeed there might well be contestation among the EU actors involved in constructing any given policy, with more than one narrative framing policy, which, again, has implications for how far the EU can influence any given sector through its actions in the relevant global fora. The contradictions in the EU's projections are thus also important in terms of the EU's ability to influence. Overall, what is salient in terms of analyzing internal factors is to illuminate the extent to which EU policy processes either constrain or facilitate action in response to 'opportunity' in the telecommunications and Internet governance sector.
Finally, the third dimension of the framework is that of the EU's 'presence' as an actor within any given issue area -that is, the ability of the EU, given the opportunity structure and its capability, to exert influence beyond its borders (within global governance fora, in this case). From our perspective then, this is very much related to the EU's identity (as above), but it does also denote purposive action (in contrast to Bretherton and Vogler's definition) . In this sense, the most important issue in this dimension is how the EU can influence the behavior of others in international fora, in this case the WTO, ICANN and the IGF, given the way in which it has constructed and framed its policy projections on telecommunications and Internet governance. How, and through what processes and instruments, for example, will the EU engage in order to project its own position for the purpose of influencing the behavior of other actors towards its own goals, objectives (image)? The nature of the EU's engagement, of course, very much depends on the regime context itself, as well as the EU's own evolving identity and how this impacts on its engagement. Interesting in this context, is the contrast between telecommunications and Internet governance, and indeed, whether this leads to different EU strategies, and differentiated rates of effectiveness within and across the regime contexts. On this, it is important to note that telecoms and Internet governance are most different cases that throw up different questions at an overarching level in terms of EU influence. In telecommunications, for instance, the analysis is less about influencing the institutional form within which telecoms negotiations play out (that is, the WTO), but rather the governance and policy framework for global telecommunications, underpinned by the EU's own projection of how this should function. In terms of Internet governance, the still contested and aspirational nature and identity of its global institutions, in particular the IGF, a body currently under review, shifts the primary focus to the EU's strategy and normative preferences for how such institutions should evolve and function. For telecommunications, the focus is on the EU construction of policy and subsequent activities within the WTO in influencing (primarily) the Basic Telecommunications Framework and in Internet governance, it is on how the EU has sought to shape the institutional design and reform of ICANN and the IGF in terms of its governance and policy-making processes. The comparison of these cases will shed light on the dynamics and conditions within which the EU can influence policy and governance in two contrasting cases within the communications milieu.
In summary then, the broad framework outlined above leads us to ask the three following core or overarching questions:
1. What is the opportunity context which has led the EU to act in telecommunications and Internet governance?
How has the EU capitalized on this opportunity in telecommunications and
Internet governance in terms of its internal logic -that is the politics and construction of policy and positions? 3. Given the opportunity structure and the EU's constructed position in telecoms and Internet governance, how has the EU engaged in the telecommunications and Internet governance regimes, and has this led to change a) in terms of the behavior or collective understanding of key actors towards EU norms and preferences in policy and governance (i.e. achieving EU aims) b) the EU's own identity and action in telecoms and Internet governance?
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Opportunity/External logics
Telecommunications, the oldest part of electronic network communications, has been viewed as a sector of strategic international importance since the late 19 th century. Since then, successive efforts were made to coordinate international telegraphy, and thereafter telephony, at the international institutional level, a key landmark in which was the establishment of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as an agency of the United Nations in 1946. As telecommunications systems developed physically at the national level across the globe with the incremental roll out of infrastructure and delivery of service, so too developed a socio-economic normative framework for how telecommunications should be structured and delivered. This was predicated on the efficacy of the intertwined assumptions of natural monopoly and the social policy aspiration of universal service. Thus, telecommunications functioning and development became a key constituent of national policies irrespective of the political character of the systems in which they developed. This notwithstanding, the need to realize the international, if not global, potential of telecommunications was recognized, though its pursuit was expressly underpinned by inter-national coordination in the development of technical and economic standards, rather than integration. The classic example here was the international accounting rate system, developed within the ITU, between the monopoly (usually state owned) telecommunications administrations, essentially a series of bilateral economic interface agreements to interconnect telecommunications traffic and share the associated call revenues.
However, by the mid-1970s, this stable system of international telecommunications came under challenge from broader changes which were building in the international political economy. Here, upswings in the level of international production, driven by the efforts of increasingly powerful multinational companies, were underpinned by strongly articulated arguments in favour of increasing levels of international economic integration in pursuit of globalization. Electronic network communications came to be viewed by those at the forefront of economic internationalization as key tools to enable coordination and expansion of business activities. Technological changes which were occurring in telecommunications at the time promised faster and more sophisticated services with potentially global reach and were eagerly anticipated by corporate business users. At the same time, however, there was concern about the ability of the then existing structure of domestic and international telecommunications to deliver what was demanded on time and to the required standard.
As has been well established, the movement for economic globalization developed both as a normative and practical strategy for change (see Cerny 2008). Here, free, competitive markets were extolled as a superior form of economic organization to nationalized, uncompetitive ones. Economic liberalism was reincarnated as free market neo-liberalism, very importantly with an international context and logic, packaged in the modernizing rhetoric of globalization. For neo-liberals, the telecommunications sector presented itself as a clear case for reform and development at the international level. This model was first articulated in the US, whose commercial and governmental interests became key advocates for change in telecommunications to be undertaken along neo-liberal lines.
Pressure was exerted for the required political-institutional changes to be effected at the national and global levels. Implied in this was fundamental reorganization in the institutional governance of telecommunications. Here, a model of replacing state ownership and provision with independent regulation of competitively ordered, internationally open, markets began to gain influence, initially, beyond the US, in the UK. This presented a clear challenge to the architects of the traditional telecommunications systems nationally and internationally. For others, not least the European Union, it presented clear opportunities.
EU internal
As the 1980s evolved, the EU began to increase its focus on telecommunications as a policy area of strategic priority. In its policy statements on telecommunications, the European Commission took significant pains to point out to Member States the challenges presented by the EU's main external economic competitors, the US and Japan, in a changing, increasingly globally competitive, sector to which Member States needed to respond (European Commission 1984) . By contrast, the Commission showed political astuteness in highlighting to Member States opportunities to be gained through utilizing the EU institutional context to effect necessary change in telecommunications. The EU was at the time pursuing the wider project of the Single European Market whose broad objectives, the Commission argued, were co-terminus with changes necessary in telecommunications. Key policy proposals were thus presented in a landmark Green More recently, the EU has continued to press for a widening and deepening of the ABT.
In 2000, for example, it put forward a proposal that all WTO Members 'commit for 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE
Opportunity/External logics
As has already been noted above, the EU's involvement in and influence on the evolution of a global Internet governance system effectively came about after the rapid evolution of the Internet in the US through first military and then academic and civilian networks. In contrast to other electronic communications sub-sectors such as telecommunications, the EU had not articulated its position on the Internet until the late 1990s, with the Bangemann report, Europe and the Global Information Society (1994), only briefly touching on issues relating to the Internet. The opportunity for increased involvement in shaping the evolution of global institutions for Internet governance, and more specifically, the management of Internet address domain names, emerged in a context where the US government was the leading strategic actor by virtue of the fact that it effectively 'owned' the 'A' root server at the core of the system's functioning. Despite this, and the fact that the Internet had grown domestically, the global interoperability of the Internet meant that important global actors, the EU among them, had to be included in any process of the internationalization of domain names. In this context, the EU was able exert its own normative preferences (through value creating tactics -see Singh 2008: 241) for the global institutionalization of the domain name system, even though the US was, in essence, the primary negotiating actor among the other interests and coalitions involved.
Thus, the normative parameters for the governance of domain names was decided by the intervention of the US government in the domestic debate and international deliberation that emerged on globalizing domain names; of which, the outcome in terms of governance principles was a self-regulatory, not-for-profit, private organization the EU to take stock of its achievements in Internet governance and to reassert, within its own image and identity, the way forward, focusing in particular on how external and multilateral accountability can be incorporated into ICANN processes (how the AoC will work), and on the future of the IGF.
EU-internal
The above dynamic opportunity structure within the global Internet governance space, official has noted on certain Commission interjections on Internet Governance 'we have always been wary of the Commission driving the Internet agenda ' (authors' interview, 2010) . Indeed, where the Commission has sought to project uncoordinated messages it has been forced, by the HLGIG, to retract them publically or at least acknowledge that they were personal views or statements rather than an EU position. Nevertheless, this has often resulted in a confusing message for those stakeholders trying to decipher the 'official' EU position (which is derived through the informal HLGIG mechanism) and those positions often released without consultation with the HLGIG by the Commission.
It seems in the case of Internet governance the informality of the internal EU process can work well for producing single positions (this is the case for IGF and the AoC, for instance), but that it can also be quite detrimental to projecting an effective voice given the ability of key EU actors to project different (personal) messages.
In identity terms, it is clear that the EU's projections for Internet governance were imbued with its internal multilateral and its legal and regulatory state logic that has In terms of ICANN, the EU, led by the European Commission, was effective in obtaining important concessions in the initial negotiations for its construction. Given the concentration of power within the US and its leadership role, however, it was only able to do this through value based tactics and arguments that alluded to the credibility of the US in the context of its pre-agreed principles with the EU on Internet Governance. The EU was able to play on the fact that the US proposals were not reflective of a truly global system of domain name management given the unilateral control the US would retain within ICANN, and the lack of equality between governments and the private sector in constructing policy and making decisions. Such a position was clearly derived from the EU's own preferred normative governance framework, where co-regulatory arrangements involved a primary role for governments in decision making alongside and equal to private interests. Such reasoning, and the need for the US to achieve consensus, ensured the creation of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) within ICANN, which although allaying European concerns to a degree, was not seen as completely satisfactory
given that it was only to have an advisory capacity Simpson 2006, 2007) and that the only real mechanism for accountability and oversight was provided by the Since its inception, both within (in the GAC) and outside ICANN, the EU has sought to consistently secure movement on the two issues that it initially thought problematic when The EU then has supported the principle of multi-stakeholderism within Internet governance, both in ICANN and the IGF, the latter created as a compromise within the WSIS process after the EU (represented by the UK Presidency at the time), supported by the developing world (against US unilateralism), put forth an alternative proposition for an intergovernmental structure, but failed to achieve its aims because of the US refusal to move on the underlying principles of private sector leadership and management and its belief that US control was essential for the security and stability of the Internet. For the EU, the IGF was seen as an alternative forum for discussion and did not in any way replace existing institutional arrangements. Indeed, there is a high level of coherence However, despite a certain internal coherence and clarity in the official EU position on the IGF as a valuable forum for discussion, its influence in determining the outcome of the IGF evaluation process and the further evolution of Internet governance in order to meet its aims will ultimately also rest on it delivering a single and clear message -and in particular, demonstrating more obviously in practice its rhetorical commitment to multi- 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown the EU to have developed into an important actor in global electronic network communications policy-making through its activities in telecommunications and the Internet. The paper's use of an 'actorness' analytical framework has pointed up a number of similarities, but also distinct differences, in EU behaviour in these related, though at the same time rather different, sub-sectors. The framework's use also, more generally, points to conditions under which the EU is more likely, and less likely to be able to exert itself successfully in global sectoral contexts.
The analytical parameters of opportunities/external logics, internal environment and external presence are useful in illustrating the contexts, opportunities and constraints faced by the EU.
It is important to note that though telecommunications is much longer established than the Internet, in both cases the EU's involvement as a global policy actor has been relatively recent. In both cases, the EU has faced an international environment in which US ideas and practices have dominated. In telecommunications, this provided more opportunities than constraints compared with the Internet. An explanation for this lies in the fairly obvious fact that EU Member States had developed over a much longer period knowledge of, and competence in, telecommunications compared to the Internet. It is also the case too that both parties (the EU and the US) arguably stood to gain most from pursuing a similar agenda of international trade liberalization in institutional contexts such as the WTO, in particular. Though a relatively new actor in telecommunications, the EU was able to become a representative of its Member States in the WTO despite some reservations from Member States. Given the relative and perhaps unusual coherence of EU positions, due in considerable part to internally based policy agreement made that had been ongoing before and simultaneous to global negotiations, the European Commission was viewed as the best means of securing EU interests in the WTO on telecommunications.
The Internet presents a rather different situation. The EU was not able to develop any kind of coherent position on the Internet before it became a high profile global communications policy matter. However, like in telecommunications, the EU, through the European Commission in particular in the early period of intervention, proved enthusiastic and relatively adept at exploiting policy opportunities which arose. However, unlike in telecommunications, uncertainty married to the perceived need to react to policy developments which were viewed with some degree of concern, left the EU and its
Member States 'on the back foot'. Since the late 1990s, the EU has aimed to articulate and establish its interests in relevant global institutional contexts from a position of relative weakness, certainly compared to that experienced in the telecommunications case. The result has inevitably been one of partial success. A major constraint has been the relative power differential and key policy differences experienced viz-a-viz the US.
There are, however, signs that the two parties, in particular with the new Obama administration, are much more aligned in their preferences for future Internet governance than they were in the late 1990s. The EU has gained policy ground, assisted by significant uncertainty and some turbulence in the development of global Internet policy agendas, which has involved contestation of ICANN, in particular and, lately, the IGF.
The EU has, however, struggled in the past to project a clear, cogent message on Internet governance given the informal nature of its internal policy process for constructing positions on Internet governance, and the opportunities this afforded those in the Commission with their own political agenda to influence global proceedings. The result was often multiple messages, multiple EU representatives in different global fora and confusion over what the 'real' EU position was. This did not imbue the EU with the visibility or credibility required to be as influential as it could in many instances. More recently, with a change of Commissioner that seems to have taken a less assertive role (indeed she has been more interested in telecommunications but this is perhaps natural given her previous competition policy background), and agreement on the Lisbon Treaty, there has evolved an internal mechanism that is resulting in more consensual policymaking and the projection of coherent EU positions in matters of crucial importance for the future of Internet governance (the IGF and the AoC). However, given the lack of legal mandate underpinning the policy process, this does not preclude individuals and institutions from projecting their own autonomous positions in the future without reference to the established, albeit informal mechanism established through the HLGIG.
Moreover, the lack of formal EU representation will also be problematic if the EU has the ambition to be taken seriously as a 'leader' in Internet governance, beyond its own selfprojections. Addressing these two issues would certainly alleviate the problem of identifying first, the 'official' EU position, and second, who speaks and negotiates for the EU on Internet governance.
In the future, the EU faces a major global policy challenge in each of the case studies under investigation in this paper. In telecommunications, it will need to re-invigorate its profile in bodies such as the WTO and the ITU. Recent efforts to do so appear to have run into the sand, not least because, since 2006, the EU has faced a major, and at times controversial, review of its internal telecommunications policy framework: this paper shows that relatively coherent internal policy positions assist external negotiation activity. Agreement on this having been attained at the end of 2009, the EU may now aim to exert its preferences for extensive global trade liberalization more forcefully, beyond the few policy statements and a consultation made to this effect in recent years. In
Internet policy, the challenge for the EU is to refine, settle on and begin to extol in a unitary way, a clearer policy perspective within which different strategies can be created and deployed in respect of key policy areas and their respective institutional contexts.
Progress on these fronts is likely to ensure that the EU continues to be a significant actor in shaping the global communications policy milieu.
